Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
Winter 2016

Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy
Michael J. Meurer
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael J. Meurer, Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy , in 39 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
71 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2419

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Sun Nov 13 17:05:55 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Michael J. Meurer, Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'y 71 (2016).
ALWD 7th ed.
Michael J. Meurer, Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy, 39 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol'y 71 (2016).
APA 7th ed.
Meurer, M. J. (2016). Current issues in patent law and policy. Harvard Journal of Law
& Public Policy, 39(1), 71-78.
Chicago 17th ed.
Michael J. Meurer, "Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy," Harvard Journal of Law
& Public Policy 39, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 71-78
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Michael J. Meurer, "Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy" (2016) 39:1 Harv J L &
Pub Pol'y 71.
AGLC 4th ed.
Michael J. Meurer, 'Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy' (2016) 39(1) Harvard
Journal of Law & Public Policy 71
MLA 9th ed.
Meurer, Michael J. "Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy." Harvard Journal of Law
& Public Policy, vol. 39, no. 1, Winter 2016, pp. 71-78. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Michael J. Meurer, 'Current Issues in Patent Law and Policy' (2016) 39 Harv J L & Pub
Pol'y 71
Provided by:
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

CURRENT ISSUES IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY
MICHAEL J. MEURER*

Patent law and policy have received a surprising amount of
attention from courts and policymakers in recent years.' This
attention is warranted because innovation policy is critical in
determining the pace of innovation and the rate of economic
growth. The reform proposals pending before Congress are
motivated by widespread reports of abusive patent assertions
and fears that patents sometimes stifle innovation. 2
I favor most of the pending reforms and worry that our patent system, on balance, discourages innovation. But I part
company from most reform proponents who focus on harms
caused by the frivolous patent litigation mounted by many
"non-practicing entities" (NPEs).3 Instead, I want to focus on
deeper flaws in the U.S. patent system that existed before NPEs
became very active and that continue today.
In our book Patent Failure,4 James Bessen and I empirically
demonstrated that problems in our patent system predated the
flood of NPE litigation that began around 2005.5 We showed
* Professor, Boston University School of Law; J.D. and Ph.D., University of Min-

nesota; S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This Essay was adapted from
remarks given at the 2015 Federalist Society National Student Symposium held at
the University of Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Beriont v. GTE Laboratories, Inc., 535 F. App'x 919 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 674 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Steve Lohr,
With Patent Litigation Surging, Creators Turn to Washington for Help, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/technology/with-patentlitigation-surging-creators-tum-to-washington-for-help.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/3W46-SFPP].
2. See Lohr, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Adam L. Massaro, Phased Discovery in Patent Litigation: A Powerful
Tool Within the Existing Litigation Frameworkfor Combating Actions by Non-Practicing
Entities, NAT'L L. REV. (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/phased-discovery-patent-litigation-powerful-tool-within-existinglitigation-framewor [http://perma.cc/69JA-HR4Y].
4. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).

5. Id. at 144.
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that, on average, the patent system actually taxes innovators in
most industries (except, notably, in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries).6 We attribute this innovation tax to problems of "low patent quality." 7 Though, again, these problems
are largely absent in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as the patents there are relatively high quality.8
There are three kinds of quality problems that reformers
have identified. First, there are mistakes by patent examiners
and courts. Second, the inventive step-the so-called nonobviousness requirement9 -in our patent system is too low.
This means that valid patents are granted on uninteresting and
low-quality inventions. 0 Third-and this is my main concernis that patents are not sufficiently "property-like."" I will use
the term "notice failure" to denote this kind of problem.
Initially, most patent-reform activity in the past decade has
focused on quality problems caused by patent examination
mistakes. 12 These reforms were well intentioned but were not
significant enough to have much effect on the innovation tax.
More recent reforms focus on mitigating the harm caused when
low-quality patents are asserted. 3 Here, there has been a bit
more progress. Now, we possibly have a new wave of reform
coming that will address notice failure. 14

6. Id. at 145.
7. Id. at 18-19.
8. Id. at 145.
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2013); Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the
Indeterminate Nonobvious Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS

L. REV. 57, 62 (2009).
10. Mandel, supra note 9, at 62.
11. See, e.g., Roger Milgrim, An Independent Invention Defense to Patent Infringement: The Academy Talking to Itself Should Anyone Listen?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 295, 305 n.44 (2008) (analogizing patent rights to property rights in
order to illustrate a patent law problem).
12. See, e.g., Sabra Chartrand, A Bid to Overcome Patent Backlogs, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/23/technology/23PATE.html
[http://perma.cc/A7UE-X5NX].
13. See, e.g., Jeff J. Roberts, New version of Google Patents makes it easier to weed out
low quality patents, FORTUNE (July 16, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/16/newversion-of-google-patents-makes-it-easier-to-weed-out-low-quality-patents
[http://perma.cc/WQC2-VPJ6].
14. See generally Mark Rawls, Fixing Notice Failure: How to Tame the Trolls and
Restore Balance to the Patent System, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 561 (2014).
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Patent notice reform, if it comes at all, likely will come from
many sources. Some of the reforms being considered in Congress will improve patent notice and make the patent system
more property-like.15 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is
considering reforms to make patent ownership more transparent and patent scope more precise.1 6 I suspect that much of the
significant reform will come from the courts. I hope that scholars will influence Federal Circuit judges and clerks so that judicial lawmaking will be more sensitive to the ways in which an
over-reaching patent system can impede innovation. I envision
a change in thinking about patents comparable to the change in
thinking about antitrust law associated with the "Chicago
School" approach to antitrust.' 7
So, what do I mean by "notice failure"? Suppose I own the
parcel of land called Whiteacre and there is a neighboring parcel
owned by another called Blackacre. Suppose I want to build an
office tower on Whiteacre. I hire a surveyor, look at the deeds,
and talk to my lawyers. Finally, I build the office tower on
Whiteacre. In a property system with good notice, I will have
little trouble building the tower on Whiteacre and keeping it off
of Blackacre. Notice failure, however, could lead me to accidentally build part of my tower on Blackacre. Good notice allows me to avoid such an accident. If I have reason to build partly on Blackacre, I would negotiate to purchase some of Blackacre
in advance. If I want to stay entirely on Whiteacre, I can rely on
surveying technology and property deeds to assure that.
As one looks through case law in real property, one hardly
ever sees these sorts of disputes occurring.18 That is because we

15. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Patent Reform Bill Arises Again in Congress, WALL ST. J.
L. BLOG (FEB. 5, 2015, 12:42 PM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/law/2015/02/05/patentreform-bill-arises-again-in-congress [http://perma.cc/PFG5-ZFQJ].
16. Michelle K. Lee, Deputy Dir., U.S. Patent and Trademark Off., The Benefits
of Transparency Across the Intellectual Property System (Apr. 24, 2014), available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/benefits-transparency-acrossintellectual-property-system# [http://perma.cc/7HLW-F2LK].
17. See generally Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the
Chicago School's Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 1, 6-8 (2009)

(explaining the "Chicago School" approach to antitrust).
18. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2013).
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have good notice associated with the law of land. 9 Notice in
technology development, though, is quite different. Strangers
often fail to take notice of patent rights. 20 They fail to license
before investing in new technology, which makes them subsequently vulnerable to a lawsuit. 2 1 They also miss the opportuni-

ty to avoid infringement by designing around a patent. 22
Most firms that are sued for patent infringement are inadvertent infringers. 23 They are not pirates. Defendants typically
invest more in research and development (R&D) than plaintiffs
do. 24 Defendants thus typically own more patents than plaintiffs do. 25 They are almost never shown to have copied; they are
usually using technology that was developed independently. 26
In fact, regression analysis shows that publicly traded American firms face a risk of defending against a patent lawsuit that
increases with R&D spending after controlling for the size of
the defendant, the number of employees, the market capitalization of the defendant, and other relevant variables. 27
The story beyond this correlation is simple: The more a firm
spends on R&D, the more it innovates, and the more it innovates the greater its exposure to patent lawsuits. That is unacceptable. Innovators are exposed to patent lawsuits because of
19. Id.
20. Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2007, 2014-26 (2005).
21. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (2009).
22. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34559, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS: ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 15

(2010) (citing the development of new products and markets as a beneficial byproduct of designing around a patent).
23. See, e.g., David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to CorporateAmerica, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patentwill-sue-an-alert-to-corporate-america.html?jr=0 [http://perma.cc/SXS2-5SPC].
24. See James Bessen, The Evidence is in: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-dohurt-innovation [http://perma.cc/R6UJ-XBAB].
25. See 2014 Patent Litigation Report, UNIEDPATENTS.COM, http://unifiedpatents.com/
2014patentlitigationreport [http://perma.cc/2AY5-VNDD] (last visited Aug 4,
2014) (showing that 75.8% of NPE-related cases were filed against non-small-ormedium enterprises).
26. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1459-60.
27. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 401, 419-24 (2013).
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notice failure. I observe three key causes of notice failure and
the patent-based innovation tax, and I will discuss them in turn.
First, there is a lack of transparency in our patent system. Innovators often cannot identify which patents may be relevant to
their innovative activities and could be asserted against them. 28
The patent dispute between Research In Motion (RIM) and
NTP provides a good illustration. 29 RIM was the company that
developed the BlackBerry phone (RIM has been renamed BlackBerry Ltd.).30 Mike Lazaridis founded RIM and invented wireless e-mail. 31 Thomas J. Campana also invented wireless e-mail,
as did three other sets of inventors, all at around the same time.3 2
Campana tried and failed to commercialize his invention.3 3 RIM
learned about the NTP patents that were acquired from Campana ten years after it started development.M NTP sued RIM for
patent infringement.3 5 Under threat of injunction, RIM settled
with NTP for $612 million.36
Second, in many industries it is costly to search for patents
and difficult to identify the owners. Firms facing NPE patent
assertions often complain about strategic advantages gained by
NPEs that assign their patents to numerous shell companies.37
But transparency problems predate NPE litigation. Patent
clearance searches are difficult because patent assertions often
come from parties who are relative strangers to the defendant
firms. Bessen and I found that from 1984 to 1999, twenty-eight
percent of patent lawsuits between publicly traded American
firms involved parties from different industries.3 8 In addition,
we found that in many cases the opposing parties were also
28. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-warsamong-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html [http://perma.cc/8PJL-BKP6].
29. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
30. Id. at 1289.
31. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 47.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 49.
35. Id. at 47.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law's Customer Suit
Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1610 (2013).
38. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 27, at 433.
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distant from one another in terms of the technologies that they
patented. 39 Add to that the huge number of extant patents in
some sectors of technology 40 and it becomes truly burdensome
to read potentially relevant patents and clear rights in advance
of innovation.
Third, the boundaries of patent rights are often hard to decipher. Chemical patents typically provide good boundary information. 4 1 Most chemical inventions are claimed by what they

are42 -a style of claiming that tends to provide good notice. Other inventions generally are claimed, at least in part, by what they
do 43 -a style of claiming that tends to provide poor notice.
A simple example illustrates the ambiguities often found in
patent claims directed more to an invention's function rather
than the invention's structure: A man named Freeny invented a
retail kiosk that would produce music recorded on cassette
tapes.4 The kiosk was connected to a pre-Internet computer
with a dedicated hard line.4 5 He obtained a patent that covered
music that was transmitted over a communications line and then
recorded at a retail point of sale.46 The patent claim was wellwritten and potentially covered a broader range of technologies.47 A skillful patent attorney used abstract language in the
patent claim that later could be interpreted to cover sales of information products over the Internet. 48 Here, poor notice existed
because the language in the claim was unstable. In 1980, the
claim term "material object" could, for example, mean "cassette
39. Id.

40. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 304 (2012) (estimating the number of software pa-

tents issued each year at around 40,000).
41. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities,5 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 36 (2013) ("Chemical patent boundaries are more easily understood and searchable because patent attorneys and inventors rely heavily on a
system of chemical nomenclature ..... ).
42. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 152.
43. See, e.g., id. at 204 (noting that, for one example, Samuel F. B. Morse asserted
in his telegraph patent that "the essence of [the] invention [is] the use of the motive power .....
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id. at 199.
46. Id. at 67.
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. Id. at 199.
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tape." 4 9 By 2000 it could be interpreted more broadly to include
hard drives.50 In 1980, "point-of-sale location" probably meant
"near the cash register," 5' but by 2000 it could be interpreted
more broadly to include "in one's own bedroom where the personal computer is located." 52

These sources of patent notice failure combine to yield inadvertent infringement and a huge volume of patent litigation.
Because of notice failure, innovators have trouble designing
new technologies that avoid infringement of others' patents or
getting permission to practice the patent at an early stage of
development. I think it is likely that the risk of inadvertent patent infringement from notice failure explains why American
patents tend to discourage innovation by publicly traded
American firms (again, with the important exception of pharmaceutical and other chemical patents).
In Patent Failure, Bessen and I assess the performance of the
American patent system over the period from 1984 to 1999 by
measuring the costs and benefits of patents to publicly traded
American firms.53 We measure the benefits that firms derive
from the patents they own and compare these benefits to the
costs imposed on the same firms by patents owned by other
firms. 5 4 We find that pharmaceutical and other chemical patents

deliver a net subsidy to innovative firms, but for other technologies, the aggregate cost imposed by patents owned by others
exceeds the benefit from owning patents.5 5 Recent research confirms these results continue to hold in the twenty-first century. 56
I wish to emphasize that patent reform should not be driven
solely by concerns about frivolous patent assertions coming
from NPEs. There are more fundamental problems with our
49. Id. at 9.
50. See, e.g., Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
51. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 9.
52. Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1334.
53. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 138-41.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 120-21.
56. James Bessen et al., Trends in Private Patent Costs and Rents for Publicly-Traded
United States Firms (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 145, 2015),
[http://perma.cc/
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2278255

74JU-EVER].
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patent system. Patents are not sufficiently property-like in the
sense that the U.S. patent system provides poor notice regarding the existence, ownership, and scope of patent rights. Poor
notice makes it hard for innovators to avoid infringement during development of a new technology, and it makes it hard to
negotiate a patent license early on before an innovator gets
locked into a particular design. Notice-based patent reforms
should increase the transparency of the patent system, encourage patent applicants to mark the boundaries of their property
rights more clearly, and mitigate harms caused by notice failure through appropriate limitations on remedies.

